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INTRODUCTION

The contemporary law of arbitration originated in North America
and Europe.1 Among like-minded States with conflicting legal traditions,
* Orlando Distinguished Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of the
Pennsylvania State University.
1. Much of the development of the current law of arbitration took place in the
aftermath of WWII. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) managers in Paris
and other interested parties led the effort to draft the text and foster the acceptance of the
New York Arbitration Convention, which was opened for signature in 1958. See U.N.
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, openedfor
signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (codified at 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 201208 (1970)). See generally ARTHUR VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION
CONVENTION OF 1958 (1981).

France ratified the Convention in 1959. The Court of Cassation played a major role
in adjusting the national law to the modem exigencies of the arbitral process. The United
States ratified the Convention in 1970; the United Kingdom in 1975; Canada in 1986;
Belgium in 1975; Germany in 1961; Spain in 1977; Italy in 1969; and Portugal in 1994
after it enacted a national law modeled upon the 1980 French law of arbitration. The
adoption of the Convention, and other international instruments on arbitration, was
intended to create a regional consensus on arbitration that would allow international
merchants working in the North American-European context to rely on an effective and
enforceable transnational legal process. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Ballad of
Transborder Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 773 (2002) [hereinafter Carbonneau,
TransborderArbitration].
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arbitration represented a means of transcending the diversity of legal
It had the additional advantages of neutrality and
systems.
enforceability. 2 Arbitration's regional success and the globalization of3
national economies eventually gave it a wider, more universal vocation.
A world law of arbitration emerged and developed. 4 Not only was it
global in application, but its content was modem and sophisticated.5
States, admittedly to varying degrees, 6 had come to the realization that
2.

See THOMAS

E.

CARBONNEAU,

CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL

LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 214-48 (2005). The differences between national concepts
of a legitimate trial-as to the function of the judge and the parties, the constitution of a
record, the use and treatment of witnesses and experts, rules of evidence, and the
procedure of appeal-could render the transborder rule of law ineffective and paralyzed
by a variety of conflicts as to jurisdiction, governing law, and enforcement. See, e.g.,
PETER HERZOG, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE 253-365 (1967); RUDOLPH B. SCHLESINGER,
COMPARATIVE LAW 352-434 (4th ed. 1980); HENRY P. DE VRIES, CIVIL LAW AND THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAWYER 187-201 (1976). See also Pierre A. Karrer, The Civil Law

and Common Law Divide: An InternationalArbitratorTells It Like He Sees It, 63-1 DiSP.
RESOL. J. 72 (2008).
3. Over time, more nations in other parts of the world adhered to the New York
Convention. There are at least 141 signatory States at the present time. They also

adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, making it
their national law of arbitration. Available at www.uncitral.org. The General Assembly

amended the Model Law in 2006. A/RES./61/33 (64th sess. Agenda Item 77) (Dec. 18,
2006). See HOWARD HOLTZMAN & JOSEPH NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL
MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND

Despite some individual modifications of the paradigmatic
COMMENTARY (1980).
statutory framework, the adoptions of the UNCITRAL Model Law created, or began to
create, the foundation for a world law on arbitration. See, e.g., ARBITRATION LAW IN
GERMANY: THE MODEL LAW IN PRACTICE (Karl-Heinz B6ckstiegel, et al. eds., 2007);

Robert Morgan, The Arbitration Act 2005: UNCITRAL Model Law as Applied in
Malaysia, ASIAN DISP. REV. (H.K.) 32 (Jan. 2008).
4. See generally JULIAN D. M. LEW, LOUKAS A. MISTELIS, & STEFAN M. KROLL,
COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2003); PIETER SANDERS, THE
WORK OF UNCITRAL ON ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION (2001).
5. See PETER BINDER, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN UNCITRAL
MODEL JURISDICTIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF THE UNCITRAL MODEL
LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2000); ARON BROCHES,
COMMENTARY ON THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION (1990).
6. See ISAAK DORE, THE UNCITRAL FRAMEWORK FOR ARBITRATION IN

CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE (1993); Andre J. Brunel, A Proposal to Adopt
UNCITRAL's Model Law on InternationalCommercial Arbitration as FederalLaw, 25
TEX. INT'L L.J. 43 (1990); Burnard, The New ZealandLaw Commission's Report on the
UNCITRAL Model Law, 8 ARB. INT'L 281 (1992); Octavian Capatina, L 'applicationen
Roumanie de la loi-type et du Rglement d'arbitrage de la CNUDCI, 9 ANN. HAGUE DR.
INT'L 11 (1996); Croft, Australia Adopts the UNCITRAL Model Law, 5 ARB. INT'L 174
(1988); Alejandro M. Garro, The UNCITRAL Model Law and the 1988 Spanish
Arbitration Act: Models for Reform in Central America, 1 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 201
(1990); Hamid G. Gharavi, The 1997 Iranian InternationalCommercialArbitrationLaw:
The UNCITRAL Model Law b L 'Iranienne, 15 ARB. INT'L 85 (1999); Kaplan, Hong Kong
and the UNCITRAL Model Law, 54 ARB. 173 (1988); Somarajah, The UNCiTRAL Model
Law: A Third World Viewpoint, 6 J. INT'L ARB. 7 (1989).
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their participation and that of their nationals in the world marketplace
should only be undertaken with the adjudicatory guarantees of
arbitration. 7 In a word, international commercial arbitration (ICA) was
vital to transborder commerce; it supplied international merchants with a
functional and effective transnational adjudicatory process. 8 In some
measure, albeit with differences in the volume and diversity of
transactions and the character of institutional regulation, modern-day
ICA represented a return to the practices of the medieval trade fairs. 9
Ratification of the New York Arbitration Convention 0 and adoption
of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration11 expressed a State's formal endorsement of, and
commitment to, arbitration. These, however, were merely the first steps
in becoming a hospitable-to-arbitration jurisdiction. To parse Noam
Chomsky, 12 arbitration statutes are but a surface manifestation of the
status of arbitration in a particular legal system. Current practice reveals
that legislative endorsements can consist of facile rhetoric and constitute
a mere symbolic gesture of adherence. 13 The measure of a State's
7. This awareness was especially marked in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,
407 U.S. 1 (1972), as well as in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). See
also RENE DAVID, ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1985); P. FOUCHARD, E.
GAILLARD, & B. GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (Emmanuel

Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999); Charles N. Brower, The Global Court: The
Internationalizationof CommercialAdjudication and Arbitration, 26 U. BALT. L. REV. 9
(1997); Henry de Vries, InternationalCommercialArbitration: A ContractualSubstitute
for National Courts, 57 TUL. L. REV. 42 (1982). See generally Thomas E. Carbonneau,
Arbitral Law-Making, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1183 (2004).
8. See generally Carbonneau, TransborderArbitration, supra note 1.
9.

See generally LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW

LAW MERCHANT (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., rev. ed. 1998).
10.

See supra notes 1, 3 and accompanying text.

11. See U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, supra note 1; UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,
supra note 3.

12. Noam Chomsky is known as the father of modem linguistics for his work on
generative and transformational grammar. See, e.g., NOAM CHOMSKY, REFLECTIONS ON
LANGUAGE (1975); NOAM CHOMSKY, TOPICS IN THE THEORY OF GENERATIVE GRAMMAR
(1966); NOAM CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX (1965); NOAM CHOMSKY,
SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES (1957).

13.

See Ricardo Luzzatto, International Commercial Arbitration and the Municipal

Law of States, 157 RECUEL DES COURS 9 (1977). For example, it is unlikely that the
ratification of the New York Arbitration Convention will prevent national courts in
developing or re-emerging States, possibly at the behest of the executive branch, from
protecting local companies from efforts by MNEs to enforce arbitral awards against
them. The Cairo Court of Appeal's decision to set aside an ICC rendered against the
Egyptian Air Force in Chromalloy attests to the parochialism and protectionism that is

just below the surface of globalism.

See In the Matter of the Arbitration of Certain

Controversies Between Chromalloy Aeroservices and the Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F.
Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996). On Chromalloy,see Hamid G. Gharavi, Chromalloy: Another
View, 12 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 21 (1997); Jan Paulsson, Rediscovering the N.Y.
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support for arbitral adjudication-the so-called deep structure 4 in
Chomsky's terminology-resides in the judicial implementation of the
regulatory provisions on arbitration. Proverbially stated, the daily
activity of melding the proclaimed law to the circumstances of actual
litigation is where the "rubber meets the road." The courts construe the
decisive issues of the law and practice of arbitration from the vantage
point of specific disputes, parties, and transactions. The policy that
guides the judicial decision-making on matters of arbitrability, 5 the
powers of the arbitrator, 16 and the enforcement of arbitral awards 17 is

accurate testimony of a jurisdiction's disposition on arbitration.
Statutory proclamations gain real meaning in court decisions.
In Western, democratic States, courts, therefore, play a critical part
in integrating arbitration into the operation of the legal system. 8 This
article describes and assesses the work of three national courts in regard
The English experience demonstrates that judicial
to arbitration.
diffidence toward arbitration and concomitant reverence for the cohesion
of substantive law can hamper the acceptance and function of arbitration
within the legal system. 19 Despite a vibrant arbitration business in
London involving the sale of commodities, maritime transactions, and
the provision of insurance, 20 the adjudicatory capability of arbitration
continues to be suspect in the English legal system. 2' The distrust of
arbitration began with, and has been sustained by, the courts; 22 the latter

Convention: Further Reflections on Chromalloy, 12 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 20
(1997); Gary H. Sampliner, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards After Annulment in
Their Country of Origin, 11 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 22 (1996).
14. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
15. For a description of arbitrability and arbitrability issues, see THOMAS E.
CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 23-27 (2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter
CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE].

16. For a description of the powers of the arbitrator, see id. at 28-30.
17. For a discussion of the enforcement of arbitral awards, see id. at ch. 9.
18. See Lane, The Role of the Legislature and the Courts in the Development of the
Arbitration Process, 52 ARB. 195 (1986). For an illustration, see the contrast of result
between the opinion in Chromalloy, 939 F. Supp. 907, and Spier v. Calzaturificio
Tecnica, S.P.A., 77 F. Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). See also Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses
H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 33-73.
20. See ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN H. HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (3d ed. 1999); Lord Justice Saville, The
Arbitration Act 1996, [1997] LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 502.

21.

See Arbitration Act 1996 §§ 45, 69, & 87; see also

PRACTICE,

CARBONNEAU,

LAW

AND

supra note 15, at 561-65.

22. See Lord Hacking, The "Stated Case" Abolished: The United Kingdom
ArbitrationAct of 1979, 14 INT'L LAW. 95 (1980); William W. Park, JudicialSupervision
of Transnational Commercial Arbitration. The English Arbitration Act of 1979, 21
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have been preoccupied with preserving their interpretative authority in
regard to English commercial law.23
The French and American experiences attest to a contradistinctive
use of judicial authority in regard to arbitration. In both legal systems,
the courts have been instrumental to the elaboration of a receptive and
accommodating law on arbitration.24 In these legal systems, legislative
enactments are used as a springboard for developing a judicial policy and
decisional practice that greatly favor the arbitral process and its effective
implementation. 25 In each system, the courts performed a legislative
function in which they gave voice to an interest that they believed to be
vital to the national welfare.2 6 Although the courts exceeded the bounds
of their legitimate institutional power, they fashioned a policy and27
creatively applied it by forging a fully functional law of arbitration.
ICA would not have risen to its level of prominence without the
decisional rulings of the French Court of Cassation 28 or the U.S. Supreme
Court.2 9 Moreover, domestic adjudication within the United States was
irretrievably altered by the American High Court's endorsement of
arbitration. 30 At least in the United States, and perhaps elsewhere as
well, lobbying and the pressure of campaigning at times rendered the
legislative branch incapable of envisaging and pursuing the national
interest. 31 Be that as it may, the high courts in both France and the
United States continue to pursue vigorously the elaboration of a liberal,
pragmatic, and adaptive law of arbitration.32
HARV. INT'L L.J. 87 (1980)
Y.B. COM. ARB. 3 (1983).

23.

[hereinafter Park, Judicial Supervision]; Steyn, England, 8

See Clive Schmitthoff, The Supervisory Jurisdiction of English Courts, in

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LIBER AMICORUM FOR MARTIN DOMKE 289 (P. Sanders

ed., 1967).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 74-179.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 74-76, 120-26, 132-41, 151-67.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 95-100, 178-79.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 95-100, 178-79.
28. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Elaboration of a French Court Doctrine on
International CommercialArbitration:A Study in Liberal CivilianJudicial Creativity, 55
TUL. L. REv. 1 (1981) [hereinafter Carbonneau, Elaboration].
29. See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, at 58-76.
30. See id. at xv-xxiv.
31. See generally THOMAS E. MANN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: How CONGRESS IS
FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK (2006); ALAN L. Moss, SELLING
OUT AMERICA'S DEMOCRACY: How LOBBYISTS, SPECIAL INTERESTS, AND CAMPAIGN
FINANCING UNDERMINE THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE (2008).

32. In a judgment dated February 1, 2005, the Court of Cassation upheld the Paris
Court of Appeal ruling in NIOC v. Israel, recognizing NIOC's right to have a French
court appoint an arbitrator in circumstances in which the State of Israel was unwilling
and/or prevented by law from appointing its arbitrator. The exercise of French judicial
authority was intended to avoid a prospective denial of justice. See Judgment of Feb. 1,
2005, Cass. Ire civ., Fr., Juris-Data No. 2005-026746, J.C.P. No. 11 (Mar. 17, 2005). For

1348

II.

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 113:4

THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE

The history of English arbitration law exemplifies the use of judicial
supervision to safeguard society from the possible decisional
imperfections of arbitral rulings. After all, arbitrators are but lay experts,
often merchants, who ignore and may be insensitive to the refinements
and intricacies of professional adjudication.3 3 English courts have long
perceived arbitration as an inferior remedy-a murky and shallow
reflection of judicial justice. From a historic perspective, they viewed
unschooled arbitrators as prone to ineptitude.34 These merchant judges
could operate only in a makeshift, truncated process of adjudication. As
early as eighteenth century practice, English courts entertained common
law petitions against arbitral awards; in these pleadings, the parties could
challenge either the arbitrators' factual determinations or legal
conclusions. 35 Upon a finding of error, the King's Bench would vacate
the entire award. It was the only sanction available to rectify a would-be
mistake. 36 Over time, the extreme consequence of a successful challenge
to an award encouraged arbitrators to engage in self-protective behavior.
In order to minimize judicial supervision, they began to render awards
without any reasoned legal explanation for their determinations, thereby
37
restricting the possibility of judicial vacatur to evident factual error.
The practice, one suspects, might have generated over time the
perception that arbitrators were primarily, if not exclusively, finders-offact rather than theologians of law.
The Common Law Procedure Act of 1854 attempted to counter the
arbitrator practice of rendering so-called unreasoned awards. 38 It
introduced the "special case" (also known as the "stated case" or "case
stated") procedure, under which arbitrators were authorized to refer a
legal question that arose in an arbitration for court decision. 39 The
procedure was intended to quell arbitrator apprehensions about judicial
supervision and, yet, assure that courts continued to be the exclusive
oracles of the law. Whether a legal question should be referred to the
the U.S. Supreme Court, see Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396,
552 U.S. (2008); Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978 (2008).
33. See generally Mayer, Les reactions de la doctrine 6 la creation du droit par les
juges en droit internationalprivi, 31 TRAVAUX DE L'ASSOC. HENRI CAPITANT 385

(1980); Earl S. Wolaver, The HistoricalBackground of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U.
PA. L. REV. 132 (1934).
34. See generally Mayer, supra note 33; Wolaver, supra note 33.
35. See Hacking, supra note 22, at 96.
36. See id.
37.

See id.

38. See Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, 17 & 18 VICT. (cited in Hacking, supra
note 22, at 97).
39. See Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, § V, at 978.
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courts was within the arbitrator's discretion-at least, at this stage in the
evolution of the process.4n Moreover, the case law prohibited contracting
parties from revoking the arbitrator's referral discretion in their
agreement:
This is done in order that the Courts may ensure the proper
administration of the law by inferior tribunals. In my view, to allow
English citizens to agree to exclude this safeguard for the
administration of the law is contrary to public policy. There must be
no Alsatia in England where the King's Writ does not run.41
The court's reasoning emphasized the importance of achieving
adjudicatory results through the proper application of law and the
essential role the courts played in realizing that objective. Similarly,
contracting parties could not authorize arbitrators to rule in equity instead
of law. 4' Given the division between law and equity and the nature of
equity, courts were unable to supervise arbitral awards rendered on the
basis of arbitrator perceptions of fairness.43 The relationship between
arbitration and the courts had all the trappings of a Cinderella story or a
Dickens novel. Arbitral tribunals were thought of as the step-children of
the legal process, and it was believed that they should recognize their
disabilities and lowly status and allow courts to supply the lawful
conclusion to litigation.
Obviously, the foregoing developments reinforced the judicial
power to oversee the determinations reached by arbitrators. The public
interest in law application and adjudication demanded that courts have
the authority to revisit all aspects of adjudication achieved through
arbitration. The arbitral process, therefore, had little integrity and was,
for all intents and purposes, devoid of real autonomy and independence.
The integrity of law was seen as the primary and overriding value.
The Arbitration Act of 1950 sought to ameliorate the standing of
arbitration under English law.44 The Act conferred greater legitimacy
upon the process and proclaimed arbitration agreements to be lawful and
enforceable contracts.4 5 Moreover, by leave of court, arbitral awards
could be enforced like judicial judgments 46 because they were entitled to
the same binding effect as court rulings. The grounds for challenging
arbitral awards were limited to irregularities in the conduct of the
40. See id.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Czamikow v. Roth, Schmidt & Co., [1922] 2 K.B. 478,488 (C.A.).
See Schmitthoff, supra note 23.
See id
See Arbitration Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, ch. 27, reprinted in 2 INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Doc. VII E. 1, 129-49 (C. Schmitthoffed., 1983).

45. Id. at § 26.
46.

Id.
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proceedings and the commission of fraud in securing an award.47
Unfortunately, the 1950 Act also provided for the judicial review of the
merits of arbitrator determinations.4 8 The availability of this form of
judicial supervision impeded the full rehabilitation of arbitration under
English law.
The 1950 Act adopted the old common-law writ procedure. 49 An
award could be set aside for an "error on its face" (i.e., when a
manifestly erroneous legal conclusion was evident on the face of the
award).50 The arbitrators' practice of not providing reasons for their
determinations, however, eliminated the supervisory force of this
procedure. The Act also codified the stated case procedure which
became, in effect, the primary means in England of effectuating the
judicial supervision of awards. 5 1 The statute provided two forms of
judicial supervision for questions of law-a "consultative case" that
applied to legal questions that arose during the arbitral proceedings, and
a case for "alternative final awards" that applied to the arbitrator's
52
statement of legal questions at the end of the arbitration. Under either
procedure, the arbitrator could state the case to the court, or the High53
Court could order the arbitrator to state the legal question to it.
Additionally, an arbitrating party could seek a court order to4 compel the
arbitrator to state a case when the arbitrator refused to do sof
The stated case procedure, therefore, became more coercive and
increasingly compromised the arbitrator's decision-making role. The
Court of Appeal eventually determined that a court could order an
arbitrator to state a case, even when the latter objected to it. 55 In other

47. Id. at § 24. The legislation attributed standard adjudicatory powers to arbitrators
by allowing them to administer oaths and to hear the parties and witnesses under oath.
The arbitrators were authorized to issue subpoenas against any party, but only to the
extent available in an ordinary judicial action. Id. at § 12(4). The attribution and
recognition of such powers enhanced the systemic standing of arbitration as an
adjudicatory remedy. The Act also commanded that the courts assist the arbitral process
when coercive legal authority became necessary. Id. at §§ 10, 12(6), 13, and 23.
Providing for the judicial enforcement of discovery orders, the judicial removal of
ineffective arbitrators, or the judicial extension of time limits for arbitration, further
enhanced the legitimacy of arbitral adjudication under English law.
48. Id.at§21.
49. See Park, JudicialSupervision,supra note 22, at 91-92.
50. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Adjudication: A ComparativeAssessment
of Its Remedial and Substantive Status in TransnationalCommerce, 19 TEX. INT'L L.J.
33, 42 n.30 (1984) [hereinafter Carbonneau, Arbitral Adjudication].
51. See Park, JudicialSupervision,supra note 22, at 92.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. Halfdan Greig & Co. A/S v. Sterling Coal & Nav. Corp., [1973] 1 Q.B. 843
(C.A.) (U.K.) (generally known as The Lysland case).
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words, some legal questions needed to be stated for judicial resolution as
a matter of law, namely, those that were readily defined, controversial,
and suitable for judicial debate and decision. 56 Courts gave these
characteristics their content. Also, it was mandatory that legal questions
that would decide the outcome of litigation be stated to the court." As a
consequence, judicial supervision of arbitration was heightened. An
arbitrator's would-be unreasonable refusal to state a case or to seek an
order directing that a question of law be referred to a court, usually
demanded by the likely disfavored party, could lead to the nullification
of the award. Such behavior amounted to "arbitrator misconduct. 58
This development, in effect, thwarted the parties' original intent to seek
an arbitral resolution of their disputes and it fostered the resort by
disappointed parties to undermining dilatory tactics.
Despite its stated objective and content, the 1950 Act did little to
advance the independent operation and autonomy of arbitration under
English rules. While arbitration may not have been "bastardized"
adjudication, it was far from being a respected and trustworthy co-equal
of judicial litigation. English law permitted arbitrators to assemble the
facts of a dispute, but it had little, if any, confidence in the arbitrators'
ability to determine, apply, or interpret legal rules. 59 As a consequence,
it gave parties the right to have arbitrator determinations on the law
reconsidered by a court. Appeal on the basis of questions of law became
standard procedure in arbitral practice. 60 The integrity of English
commercial law was of paramount importance.
The two latest English statutes on arbitration, 61 the Arbitration Act
1979 and the Arbitration Act 1996, represent a radical departure from the
policy of wide-ranging English judicial supervision of arbitral awards.
The recent legislation repealed an entire section of the 1950 Act and
abolished the High Court's common law jurisdiction to vacate an award

56. Id. at 861-62.
57. Id.
58. See Park, JudicialSupervision, supra note 22, at 94.
59. According to Lord Hacking, "[tihe traffic over this [the case-stated] bridge
greatly assisted the evolution of English commercial law. In contrast with other
countries, such as the United States where commercial law has developed separately
under the awards of the arbitrators and court judgments, England developed one
commercial law." Hacking, supra note 22, at 98.
60. Id
61. Arbitration Act 1979, c. 42, reprinted in 5 Y.B. COM. ARB. 239-46 (P. Sanders
ed., 1980); Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/Acts/
acts 1996/ukpga_19960023_en_1. On the 1979 Act, see sources cited supra note 22; on
the 1996 Act, see ROBERT MERKIN, ARBITRATION ACT 1996 (Lloyds Commercial Law
Library) (3d ed. 2005); MARTIN H. HUNTER & TOBY LANDAU, THE ENGLISH ARBITRATION
ACT 1996: TEXT AND NOTES (1998); Lord Justice Saville, The Arbitration Act 1996,
[1997] L.M.C.L.Q. 502.

1352

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 113:4

for manifest error of fact or law.62 Moreover, it replaced the stated case
procedure with a limited right of appeal to the High Court.63 The latter
can only be invoked with the consent of the opposing party or by leave of
court.64 The court's permission will only be granted in exceptional
circumstances in which the determination of the legal question "could
substantially affect the rights of one or more parties. 65 Further appeal to
the Court of Appeal can only be undertaken if the High Court certifies
the matter as one of "general public importance" 66 or for some other
"special reason., 67 The High Court can also order the arbitrator to state
the reasons for the decision, 68 and a legal question that arises during an
arbitration can be referred to a court at the request of the arbitrator or
when all the parties make such a request.69
In the English experience with arbitration, the judiciary acted as a
barrier to arbitration's full development and acceptance as an
adjudicatory mechanism.
English courts engaged in supervisory
practices that prevented arbitration from operating autonomously.
Arbitral determinations were subject to de novo review by courts.
Eventually, courts could command arbitrators through the stated case
procedure to refer legal questions for judicial resolution even though the
English legal system had legislatively upgraded the status of arbitration.
Judicial second-guessing of arbitrator rulings on the basis of law
compromised the effectiveness of both arbitration and arbitrators.
In the most recent English statutory statement on arbitration, despite
its conformity to world regulatory standards on arbitration,7 ° the right of
courts to review and revise arbitrator determinations on the law remains
in place, although it has been attenuated.
English courts seem
determined to confine their authority to exceptional matters, 71 but they
can-at their discretion-revisit the entirety of the arbitrator's work
product. The English legal system continues to harbor misgivings about
arbitration and its professional capabilities.
The reason for the
62. Arbitration Act 1979, c. 42, § 1(1) (U.K.), reprintedin 5 Y.B. COM. ARB. 239-46
(P. Sanders ed., 1980).
63. Id; see also William Park & Jan Paulsson, The Binding Force of International
Arbitral Awards, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 253, 272-73 (1983); William Park, The Lex Loci
Arbitri and International Commercial Arbitration, 32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 21, 40-41
(1983) [hereinafter Park, Lex Loci].
64. Arbitration Act 1979, h. 42, §§ 1(4) and 1(7) (U.K.), reprintedin 5 Y.B. COM.
ARB. 239-46; see also Park, Lex Loci, supranote 63, at 273.
65. See Park, Lex Loci, supra note 63, at 273.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, at 534-67.
71. Id. at 536, 561-65.
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minimization of arbitration relates to the preservation of English
commercial law. After years of adjustments and gradual improvements
through stare decisis, the latter has been transformed into the equivalent
of a codified law.7" Because arbitration functions primarily in mercantile
matters, English courts want to avoid the corrosion and possible
dismemberment of English commercial law by arbitrators, who have
neither the reverence for nor the appreciation of matters legal to maintain
the law's cohesion. English law, exceptionally, emphasizes the primacy
of substantive law over the need to maintain arbitration's autonomy.73
III. THE FRENCH EXPERIENCE
Prior to the enactment of a modem law of arbitration 74 in 1980 and
1981, French courts used their interpretive authority to soften the
domestic law restrictions on arbitration and adapt the law to the
operational exigencies of the arbitral process. 75 The case law also
shielded ICA from the restrictions of domestic law. 76 Before October 1,
1980, the relevant French Code provisions-true to their nineteenth
century heritage 77-established that the arbitral clause was valid only in
a narrow class of commercial transactions 78 and that arbitral awards were
generally subject to broad-gauged judicial review.79 Characteristically in
civil law systems, judicial appeal involved, or could involve, a de novo
review of the facts and the law as well as the possibility of introducing
new evidence.80 The parties could waive their right of appeal. 8 1 Even
when a waiver applied, a form of appeal was still available, although it
72.

See supra note 59 and accompanying text.

73. See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, at 561-65.
74. Decree No. 80-354 of May 14, 1980, Journal Officiel de la R~publique Franqaise
[J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], May 14, 1980, p. 1238; [1980] D.S.L. 207 (Fr.). On
the contemporary French law of arbitration, see, for example, M. DE BOIssEsON, LE
DROIT FRANqAIs DE L'ARBITRAGE: INTERNE ET INTERNATIONAL (1990); JEAN ROBERT,
L'ARBITRAGE: DROIT INTERNE, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE (6th ed. 1993); YvEs
DERAINS & ROSABEL E. GOODMAN-EVERARD, France, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON

COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (Jan Paulsson ed. Supp. 1998).
75.

See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, at 527-34.
76. See Carbonneau, Elaboration,supra note 28.
77. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Reform of the French ProceduralLaw on
Arbitration: An Analytical Commentary on the Decree of May 14, 1980, 4 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 273, 275-76 (1981) [hereinafter Carbonneau, Reform].
78. See C. Crv. art. 2061 (Code Dalloz ed. 1979-1980) (Fr.); Art. L. 631 C. COM.
(Code Dalloz ed., 1979-1980) (Fr.).
79. See HERZOG, supra note 2, at 532.
80. See id.; see also Decree No. 80-354 of May 14, 1980, Journal Officiel de ]a
R~publique Frangaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], May 14, 1980, p. 1238; [1980]
D.S.L. 207 (Fr.), art. 42; N.C.P.C. art. 1023 (Fr.).
81. See Decree No. 80-354 of May 14, 1980, Journal Officiel de la Rrpublique
Frangaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], May 14, 1980, p. 1238; [1980] D.S.L. 207
(Fr.), art. 42; N.C.P.C. art. 1010 (Fr.).
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was less expansive. 82 When an award was vacated on this basis, the
court could render a judicial judgment on the matter-unless the parties
jointly agreed otherwise.83
Given litigious dispositions, mutual
agreement to return to arbitration was unlikely at this stage of the
process. The provision represented an attempt by the enacting legislature
to salvage a situation that had gone badly.84 It had the disadvantage,
however, of eliminating the initial agreed-upon recourse to arbitration.
Further, the older French law on arbitration restrained the
arbitrability of disputes on the basis of subject matter, 85 imposed a timelimit on proceedings,86 prohibited the government and its agencies from
engaging in arbitration,87 and required that awards include a reasoned
explanation of the determinations they contained.8 8 Moreover, the code
provisions on arbitration did not recognize the separability 89 or
kompetenz-kompetenz9 ° doctrines, both of which are instrumental to the
autonomy of the arbitral process and to the arbitrator's judge-like
stature. 91 Court determination of challenges to arbitral jurisdiction
constituted a judicial intrusion upon the arbitral process. 92 Finally, the
law was unclear as to when an arbitral award acquired res judicata
effect; 93 the courts generally held that finality took place only after a
82. See Decree No. 80-354 of May 14, 1980, Journal Officiel de la Rdpublique
Franqaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], May 14, 1980, p. 1238; [1980] D.S.L. 207
(Fr.), art. 44; N.C.P.C. art. 1028 (Fr.).
83. See Decree No. 80-354 of May 14, 1980, Journal Officiel de la Rdpublique
Franqaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], May 14, 1980, p. 1238; [1980] D.S.L. 207
(Fr.), art. 44; N.C.P.C. art. 1028 (Fr.).
84. See Decree No. 80-354 of May 14, 1980, Journal Officiel de la Rdpublique
Frangaise [J.0.] [Official Gazette of France], May 14, 1980, p. 1238; [1980] D.S.L. 207
(Fr.), art. 44; N.C.P.C. art. 1028 (Fr.).
85. See C. CIv. arts. 2059 and 2060 (Fr.).
86. See N.C.P.C. art. 1007 (Fr.).
87. See C. Civ. arts. 2059 and 2060 (Fr.); Level, Compromis d' Arbitrage,in [1972]
Juris-classeur civil II arts. 2059-61, at 4-5.
88. See Decree No. 80-354 of May 14, 1980, Journal Officiel de la Rrpublique
Frangaise [J.0.] [Official Gazette of France], May 14, 1980, p. 1238; [1980] D.S.L. 207
(Fr.), arts. 31 and 32.
89. See Cass. civ. Ire, May 7, 1963, Fr., Socidtd Gosset c. Socidtd Carapelli, D. Jur.
545 (1963), note Robert; see also Cass. civ., Ire, May 18, 1971, 99 J. DR. INT'L-CLUNET
62 (1972) (Fr.); Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 5e, Feb. 21, 1964, 92
J. DR. INT'L-CLUNET 113 (1965); Cour d'appel Ire [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris,
Jan. 22, 1957, J.C.P. JurisprudenceII No. 10165 (1957).
90. On both of these inter-related doctrines, see CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE,
supra note 15, at 26-27.
91. See id
92. See id.
93. See Cass. civ., Dec. 22, 1959, D. Jur. 685 (1960) (Fr.); Cour d'appel [CA]
[regional court of appeal] Paris, May 19, 1961, J.C.P. II No. 12329 (1961); Judgment of
June 29, 1961, [1962] REV. ARB. 59; see also Riotte, La reforme de l'arbitrage,78 LES
PETITES AFFICHEs 6 (1980) (citing Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris,
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court confirmed the award, 94 thereby making the legitimacy of the award
depend upon judicial action.
The Court of Cassation 95 and several major French appellate
96
courts
were keenly aware that international commerce was vital to
French economic interests in the aftermath of World War II. Arbitration,
in turn, facilitated international commerce by supplying an effective and
predictable rule of law. 97 The Court of Cassation adjusted the dated
domestic law to the character of transnational litigation involving the
enforcement of international arbitral agreements and awards. 98 For
example, the Court, in a landmark ruling, held that-in transactions
involving international commercial arbitration-the arbitral clause was
separable from the main contract and, therefore, was unaffected by the
main contract's would-be invalidity:
[I]n matters of international arbitration, the arbitral clause, whether
concluded separately or integrated in the principal agreement, always
presents, except in unusual circumstances, a full juridical autonomy,
excluding the possibility that
99 it could be affected by the eventual
nullity of the main contract.
In other words, once an international contract included an arbitral clause,
the arbitration would take place even if a party alleged that the main
contract was unenforceable. The separability doctrine insulated the
arbitral process from specious attempts to delay and confound the arbitral
litigation. 100
July 6, 1971, D. Jur. 164 (1971)). Legal scholars argued that, once they were rendered,
arbitral awards should have resjudicataeffect. The Court of Cassation and the courts of
appeal, however, generally ruled that the finality of an award took effect only after it had
been confirmed by a court.
94. See id.; see also Jean Robert, La lNgislation nouvelle sur /'arbitrage, [1980]
Dalloz-Sirey, Chronique, No. 25, 189.
95. See, e.g., Cass. civ., Nov. 21, 1860, S. Jur., II, 331 (1861) (Fr.); Cass. civ. Ire,
May 18, 1971, 99 J. DR. INT'L-CLUNET 62 (1972) (Fr.).
96. See, e.g., Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 2e, Mar. 2, 1892,
19 J. DR. INT'L-CLUNET 879 (1892); Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal], Paris,
5e, Feb. 21, 1964, 92 J. DR. INT'L-CLUNET 113 (1965). See generally Carbonneau,
Elaboration,supra note 28.
97. See Carbonneau, Elaboration,supra note 28, at 5. See generally Carbonneau,
TransborderArbitration,supra note 1.
98. See, e.g., Carbonneau, Elaboration,supra note 28, at 31-40.
99. Cass. civ. Ire, May 7, 1963, Soci6td Gosset c. Socirt6 Carapelli, D. Jur. 545
[1963] (Fr.).
100. On separability, see Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
395, 402-04 (1967); Chastain v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., 957 F.2d 851, 854 (11th Cir.
1992); John B. Goodman Ltd. P'ship v. THF Constr., Inc., 321 F.3d 1094, 1095-97 (11 th
Cir. 2003); GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES:
DRAFTING AND ENFORCING 108 (2006); Alan Scott Rau, "Separability" in the United
States Supreme Court, 1 STOCKHOLM INT'L ARB. REV. 1 (2006); Stephen J. Ware,

1356

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 113:4

The French courts also narrowly defined the content and reach of
public policy considerations 0 1 that might have an impact upon ICA. For
example, the French decisional law shielded transborder cases from the
limited validity of the arbitral clause in domestic law. 0 2 As long as the
contract was governed by a foreign law that provided that the clause was
a valid contractual agreement, the French courts would recognize the
impact of the clause upon judicial jurisdiction and conclude that it
precluded the judicial litigation of the matter. 10 3 The restricted validity
of the agreement was not a part of imperative French law. 10 4 The courts
reached the same conclusion regarding the French rules of exorbitant
jurisdiction.10 5 These rules attributed exclusive jurisdiction to the French
courts in matters involving French nationals. 10 6 The invocation of these
rules could block the enforcement in France of foreign judgments
rendered against French nationals. 107 In international litigation cases, the
French courts held that the rules of exorbitant jurisdiction could be
waived by party agreement and that an agreement to arbitrate amounted
to a contractual waiver of the rules as a matter of law.' 0 8 Moreover, the
case law exempted international awards from the domestic law
requirement of a reasoned explanation for awards.' 0 9
Also, in its early case law, the French courts distinguished foreign
arbitral awards from foreign judgments. " 0° Holding that the contractual
foundation of arbitral awards eliminated any link between the awards and
foreign law or judicial jurisdiction, the courts determined that foreign
awards were not subject to the same stringent enforcement procedure that
applied at that time in domestic law to foreign judgments."'
Arbitration Law's SeparabilityDoctrine After Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,
8 NEV. L.J. 107 (2007).
101. See Carbonneau, Elaboration,supra note 28, at 36-40.
102. See Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 2e, Apr. 10, 1984, 21 J.
DR. INT'L-CLUNET 878 (1894).

103. See Chambre des requ6tes [Cass. req.] June 21, 1904, 31 J. DR. INT'L-CLUNET
888 (1904) (Fr.); see also Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Alger, 2e, Dec.
27, 1907, 37 J. DR. INT'L-CLUNET 538 (1910); Judgment of Dec. 18, 1913, Cr. d'appel,
Ire, Aix, 43 J. DR. INT'L-CLUNET 1218 (1916).
104. See Judgment of June 21, 1904, supranote 103.
105. See Judgment of Nov. 21, 1860, supra note 95; see also Chambre commerciale
et financire [Cass. com.] June 21, 1965, 55 REV. CRIT. DR. INT'L PR. [hereafter
R.C.D.I.P,] 477, 478 (1966) (Fr.).
106. See Judgment of Mar. 2, 1892, supra note 96; see also Judgment of June 21,
1965, supra note 105.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Dec. 9, 1955, D.S. Jur.
217; Cass. civ., Ire, June 14, 1960, 49 R.C.D.I.P. 393 (1960) (Fr.).
110. See Chambre des requites [Cass. req.] July 15, 1928, 24 R.C.D.I.P. 285 (1929)
(Fr.).
11. See id.
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Accordingly, de novo review of the ruling was not available against
arbitral awards; the latter benefitted from a simplified, less exacting
enforcement procedure-the one that applied to French domestic court
judgments.1 2 An inhospitable attitude on this score would have thwarted
the economic benefits of international commerce for France. A series of
decisions established that, in an enforcement action relating to an arbitral
award, French courts could only consider a limited number of factors for
purposes of supervision, i.e., whether the parties had the capacity to enter
into an arbitration agreement, whether the subject matter of the dispute
could lawfully be submitted to arbitration, whether the award was
rendered in proper form, and whether the award complied with the
113
fundamental requirements of French international public policy.
Additionally, French courts gave the concept of international
contract a broad definition.' 4 According to the French decisional law,
an international contract was an agreement linked to various national
legal systems and was a means of participating in international
commerce. 1 5 If an arbitral clause was incorporated in an international
contract, the latter's international character was a sufficient basis for
having the arbitration and the arbitral award legally deemed international
in scope. 116 The arbitration and the award would then be governed by the
liberal regime applying to international matters. 1 7 The courts also
insulated the process of ICA from the impact of sovereign immunity
from jurisdiction." 8 Under their reasoning, the interests of the French
State could not be pursued effectively if government agents and entities
were prevented from arbitrating disputes." 9 The State, in effect, would
have been excluded from engaging in lucrative international business
transactions.

112. Seeid.
113. See Carbonneau, Elaboration,supra note 28, at 26-27.
114. See id at 36-40.
115. See Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, June 19, 1970, J.C.P.
1971, II, 16927; see also Cass. civ., Judgment of Feb. 19, 1930, S. Jur. 1933, 1, p. 41
(Fr.); Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Colmar, Nov. 29, 1968, J.C.P. 1971,
II, 16246.
116. See Cass. civ. Ire, Jan. 11, 1972, 99 J. DR. INT'L-CLUNET 621 (1972) (Fr.); Cour
d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 5e, Apr. 28, 1976, REv. ARB. 151 [1977]
(Fr.); Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Ire,
Paris, Oct. 24, 1975, 65 R.C.D.I.P. 538 (1976); Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.]
[ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Ire, Paris, May 6, 1976, 66 R.C.D.I.P. 718 (1977).
117. See sources cited in supra note 116.
118. See Cour d'appel Ire [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Apr. 10, 1957, 88 J.
DR. INT'L-CLUNET 1002 (1958); Cass. civ., Ire, May 2, 1966, D.S. Jur. 525; Cour d'appel
Ire [CA] [regional court of appeal] Aix-en-Provence, May 5, 1959, 87 J. DR. INT'LCLUNET 1077 (1960); Cass. civ., Ire, Apr. 14, 1964, 92 J. DR. INT'L-CLUNET 646 (1965).
119. See id.
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The foregoing decisional law became the foundation of a new
codified law on arbitration, the Decree of May 14, 1980, and the Decree
of May 12, 1981.120 The first decree revamped the domestic law of
arbitration by filling in gaps and providing a more organized and
coherent regulatory framework for arbitration. 12 1 It remedied many of
the uncertainties in the application and interpretation of the prior law.
The regulation of arbitration was clearer and more focused. Arbitration
was recognized as a viable and effective adjudicatory process. It reached
final, binding results. Courts were required to assist the process when
122
such assistance was necessary to its implementation and operation.
The second decree addressed international arbitration. 123 It represented
unprecedented legislation in France.
It embodied a very liberal
regulatory policy on international arbitration, including giving effect to
the concept of "a-national" arbitration and promoting the role of contract
freedom in establishing the regime of legal rules for arbitration. 124 The
law also allowed arbitrators to rule pursuant to commercial custom.
Further, the contracting parties could invest them with the power to
decide as amiable compositors. 125 The basic judicial function in
arbitration was to enforce the parties' intent to arbitrate and to assist the
operation of the process.126
IV. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

It is well-settled that legislated legal rules are less than infallible
declarations of law. 127 Courts can discover ambiguity and draw
contradistinctions in the most ironclad propositions. The two linchpin
provisions of the U.S. or Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 128 §§ 2 and
120. Decree No. 80-354 of May 14, 1980, Journal Officiel de la R6publique Frangaisc
[J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], May 14, 1980, p. 1238; [1980] D.S.L. 207 (Fr.);
Decree No. 81-500 of May 12, 1981, Journal Officiel de la R6publique Frangaise [J.O.]
[Official Gazette of France], May 12, 1981, p. 1398.
121. See Carbonneau, Reform, supra note 77, at 276-78.
122. See id. at 280.
123.

See Carbonneau, ArbitralAdjudication,supra note 50, at 77.

124.
125.
126.
127.

See id.
Id. at 78.
Id.at 78-79.
See ROBERT

LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROBLEMS: DEVELOPMENT, STATUS, AND TREND
OF THE TREATMENT AND EXERCISE OF LAWMAKING POWERS (2006); WILLIAM FELLDEN
CRAIES, CRAIES ON LEGISLATION: A PRACTITIONERS' GUIDE TO THE NATURE, PROCESS,

EFFECT, AND INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION (2004); Jacob E. Gersen, Legislative Rules

Revisited, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1705 (2007); Daniel Greenberg, The Nature of Legislative
Intention and Its Implications for Legislative Drafting, 27 STATUTE L. REV. 15 (2006);

Michael B. Miller, The Justiciability of Legislative Rules and the "Political" Political
Question Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1341 (1990).

128. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. Title 9, §§ 1-14, was first enacted on February 12, 1925 (43
Stat. 883), codified July 30, 1947 (61 Stat. 669), and amended September 3, 1954 (68
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10, illustrate the potential significance of the judicial role in the
elaboration of an American law of arbitration. FAA § 2 provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or
the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement
in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out
of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.
Depending upon the predilection of the ruling court, the statutory text has
a number of features that could become problematic. First, although it is
clear that the rule that is eventually propounded applies to both types of
arbitration agreements,1 30 the circumlocution at the outset of the rule
could generate discussion about what is intended and the purpose of the
statement. For example, why must a transaction evidence commerce?
When does a dispute exist or arise? Can all prospective disputes be
submitted to arbitration? What is meant by a "refusal to perform the
whole or any part thereof'? Second, does the reference to "a contract,
transaction, or refusal" contradict in some measure the "in writing"
requirement of the rule? Third, what rationale explains the use of the
three celebrated adjectives: "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable." Are
they merely redundant? Finally, what specifically are those "grounds" at
"law or in equity" that can invalidate or lead to the revocation of a
contract?
Likewise, FAA § 10, despite the generally clear underpinnings of
the provision, contains numerous examples of potential interpretative
uncertainty. It reads:
a.

In any of the following cases the United States court in and for
the district wherein the award was made may make an order
vacating the award upon the application of any party to the
arbitration:

Stat. 1233). Chapter Two was added on July 31, 1970 (84 Stat. 692). Two sections were

added to Chapter One by Congress in October 1988, and renumbered on December 1,
1990 (Pub. L. Nos. 669 and 702); Chapter Three was added on August 15, 1990 (Pub. L.

No. 101-369); and Section 10 was amended on November 15, 1990. See generally IAN R.
MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES
UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT (1994).
129. 9 U.S.C. § 2. On the FAA and Section 2, see CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE,

supra note 15, at 78-80, 99-114.
130. On the types of arbitration agreements, see
supra note 15, at 22.

CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE,
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1.

Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or
undue means.

2.

Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them.

3.

Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing
to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the
rights of any party have been prejudiced.

4.

Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.

5.

Where an award is vacated and the time within which the
agreement required the award to be made has not expired
the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the
arbitrators.

The United States district court for the district wherein an
award was made that was issued pursuant to section 590 of title
5 may make an order vacating the award upon the application
of a person, other than a party to the arbitration, who is
adversely affected or aggrieved by the award, if the use of
arbitration or the award is clearly inconsistent with the factors
set forth in section 582 of title 5.131

The possible weak links in the text are legion. Suffice it to note that the
rule seems to be directed exclusively to federal district courts; the key
words and concepts ("corruption, fraud, or undue means"; "evident
partiality"; "prejudice"; "excess of powers"; "mutual, final, and definite
award") are not defined; the notion of a "rehearing by the arbitrators" is
not explained; and, lastly, the third-party right to oppose an award is
described in opaque language that makes the elaboration of an applicable
rule difficult.
There can be no doubt that the foregoing statutory provisions are
instrumental to the American legal system's regulation of arbitration.
The validity, enforceability, and binding character of arbitration
agreements are critical to the effectiveness of the arbitral process, as is

131. 9 U.S.C. § 10. On the provision, see
note 15, at 124-27, 359-428.

CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra

2009]

JUDICIAL APPROBATION

the enforcement of arbitral awards. 132 The rules stipulated here are
simultaneously the backbone and soft underbelly of the U.S. law of
arbitration. If given full effect by the courts, these rules could act as the
foundation for a functional process for regulating arbitration, upon which
legal practitioners and their clients could rely with confidence. If applied
critically by courts that subject the provisions to variegated analytical
objections, they could readily become insurmountable obstacles to the
effective implementation of the arbitral process.
In point of fact, the courts, under the leadership of the U.S. Supreme
134
Court, 133 have anchored the statutory law in a "strong federal policy,'

unequivocally supportive of arbitration in all circumstances. Moreover,
courts, again, especially the U.S. Supreme Court, have purged the
statutory text of its limitations on the recourse to arbitration and added
content that enables the process to operate. 135 The federal judicial policy
favoring arbitration was the Court's invention.' 36 Neither the statute nor
its legislative history gave an inkling of-let alone identified-such a
phrase or policy.137 It originated with the Court's construction of FAA §
2. In that provision, the Court discovered an imperative that demanded
the eradication of the judicial hostility to arbitration and an absolute
judicial duty to enforce arbitration agreements as drafted by the
contracting parties.
The Court declared that the legislative obligation
imposed upon courts was to respect and protect the contractual privilege
to arbitrate. 139 As the would-be federal judicial policy on arbitration
developed in the case law, FAA § 2 eventually came to house impliedly a
federal right to arbitrate, which acquired a preemptory constitutional
standing. 140
The express language of the statute notwithstanding,
ordinary contract defenses became ineffective against agreements to
arbitrate. 141 The proclamation of policy was deaf to whispers of ordinary

See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, at 57.
133. Id.at 70.
134. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
624-25 (1986); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 2425 (1983).
135. See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, at 80-95.
136. See id at 58, 69.
137. See id at 69.
138. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468 (1989); Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. at 24-25.
139. See, e.g., Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
140. See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, at 74.
141. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000); Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173 (3d
Cir. 1999).
132.
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legality. The bellows of policy silenced the murmurings of basic
analysis.
But for several rulings on principle, 142 FAA § 10 has not had the
benefit of extensive or detailed interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Keenly aware of the Court's disposition on matters of arbitration, the
lower federal courts have integrated the essential. tenets of the "strong
federal judicial policy" favoring arbitration into the decisional law
addressing vacatur and confirmation actions. 143 Growing weary of pro
forma declarations, one federal court described the judicial supervision
of arbitral awards as ascertaining whether the arbitrators "did the job
they were told to do-not whether they did it well, or correctly, or
reasonably, but simply whether they did it.' ' 144 The arbitrator's core
function is to rule, to decide the matter and to render a determination in
an award. The judicial scrutiny of awards under the statute, then, is far
145
from exacting; most courts merely engage in a perfunctory exercise.
Even with the addition of common law grounds by which courts can
assess the arbitrator's determination on the merits, 146 very few arbitral
awards are vacated. 147 The federal judiciary has never undertaken a
rigorous application of the statutory text or discovered disabling
problems in its application. 148 With very few exceptions, 149 the standard
150
practice has been to give full legal effect to the arbitrator's decision.
142. See Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 17,
531 U.S. 57 (2000); United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S.
29 (1987); Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145
(1968).
143. See generally CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, at 359.
144. See Remmey v. Paine Webber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied 513 U.S. 1112 (1995) (citing Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v.
Transp. Commc'ns Int'l Union, 973 F.2d 276 (4th Cir. 1992)).
145. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
146. See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, at 369-86.
147. See id.at 359-63.
148. See id.at 359-429.
149. See, e.g., Patton v. Signator Agency Inc., 441 F.3d 230 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding,
despite ordinarily being favorable to arbitration, that the arbitrator "manifestly
disregarded the law" by holding that a time bar provision in the parties' earlier contract
could be implied in their subsequent agreement; contract interpretation usually falls
within the arbitrator's sovereign discretion); Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197
(2d Cir.), cert. denied 526 U.S. 1034 (1999) (reconsidered in Wallace v. Buttar, 378 F.3d
182 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that the arbitrator's holding represented either a "manifest
disregard" of the law or facts in the case, leading a lower court in Wallace to vacate an
award on the basis of a "manifest disregard of the facts," in effect, a new ground for
vacatur quickly disavowed by the appellate court)); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon
Seaman's Union, 11 F.3d 1189 (3d Cir. 1993) (weaving together parts of various enacted
regulatory provisions to discover a federal policy against oil spills and environmental
damage; the reasoning and ruling contradicted the Misco standard for applicable public
policy and generated a more diffuse and ad hoc sense of the concept). It should be noted
that California state courts have demonstrated a consistent pattern of nullifying
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Even when the law was embryonic, it was clear to the Court1 5 1 and
the lower federal courts 152 that state law variations could wreak havoc in
the "edifice of law"'153 as it began to take shape. In order to create a
uniform national law of arbitration with agreed-upon foundational
principles, the Court federalized the law of arbitration by subjecting
conflicting state arbitration laws to federal preemption. 15 4 The Court
declared that the FAA applied in federal and state courts' 55 and also
limited the enactment power of state legislatures on matters of
arbitration. 156 States laws that conflicted with the FAA, even when
enacted to protect basic legal rights or achieve public policy objectives,
were deemed unlawful and unenforceable. 157 A single and singular
imperative dominated all determinations.
Another vital Court contribution to the law of arbitration was the
expansion of the arbitrator's jurisdictional authority. The first stage of
this doctrinal development came in the form of the statutory arbitrability
160
59
cases. 158 The confluence of the rulings in Mitsubishi,' McMahon,
Rodriguez,16 and Gilmer' 62 established with unmistakable clarity that
arbitrators could rule on statutory claims, as well as contract breach

arbitration agreements in disparate-party arbitrations and refusing to apply the severance
doctrine to salvage the parties' basic agreement to arbitrate disputes. See, e.g., Broughton
v. Cigna Healthplans of Ca., 988 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999) (holding that claims for injunctive
relief under the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act are inarbitrable, finding an
"inherent conflict" between the recourse to arbitration and the primary purpose of
statutory remedies intended to prohibit harmful conduct to the general public); see also
Abramson v. Jupiter Networks, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 422, 422 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) ("[A]n
employee seeking to vindicate unwaivable [public law] rights may not be compelled to
pay forum costs that are unique to arbitration."); Chin v. Dollar Fin. Group, 2004 WL
2039794 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (finding of unconscionability of the arbitration agreement
because of a lack of mutuality and refusal to sever).
150. See supra note 15 and text accompanying note 143.
151. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Southland Corp.
v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1 (1983); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
152. See Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir.
1959).
153. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283-84 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
154. See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, at 155.
155. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
157. See Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S.Ct. 978 (2008); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
158. On the topic of statutory arbitrability, see CARBONNEAu, LAW AND PRACTICE,
supra note 15, at 216.
159. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
160. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
161. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
162. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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In the next stage, the Court addressed the role and authority of
the arbitrator at the threshold of the arbitral process. Parsing to some
extent Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting analysis in Bazzle, 64 the
Court in effect divided the preliminary jurisdictional concerns into a
variety of analytical categories: substantive arbitrability, interpretive
arbitrability, procedural arbitrability, and subject-matter arbitrability.
Courts were to decide matters of substantive arbitrability because it
related to the question of what the parties had agreed. 165 Under FAA § 3,
to arbitrate
federal district courts rule on whether the parties had agreed
1 66
Kaplan,167
In
issue.
at
dispute
the
covered
agreement
that
and whether
the Court recognized the legal significance and remedial importance of
an arbitration agreement; 168 it also emphasized the role of contract
freedom in arbitration law by ruling that parties could agree to delegate
169
the power to decide jurisdictional challenges to the arbitrators.
Accordingly, whether the parties agreed to arbitration was to be decided
by courts, 70unless the parties "clearly and unmistakably" provided
otherwise. 1
The authority of courts to decide jurisdictional issues at the head of
the arbitral process not only could be restricted by party agreement, but it
was further narrowed by subsequent case law. Under the Court's ruling
in Bazzle, 171 arbitrators were vested with the authority to interpret the
arbitral clause.' 72 The power to interpret arbitrability allowed the
arbitrator to declare what the arbitral clause provided. The judicial role
was confined to identifying the existence of an arbitration contract; the
court's interpretative powers were surrendered to the arbitrator as a
matter of law. 173 The arbitrator, then, possessed sovereign decisional
authority over both the contract and the arbitral clause. 174 Judicial
supervision at the head of the arbitral process was significantly reduced.
Once a court ascertains the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, the
arbitrator decides all other issues in the litigation, including the content
and meaning of the arbitral clause. In Bazzle, the question of litigation
issues. 163

163. See sources cited in notes 159-62, supra.
164. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 455-60 (2003) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
165. See id.
166. 9 U.S.C. § 3.
167. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
168. See id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id.
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was whether the arbitration agreement allowed class action litigation. 175
The Court's ruling never resolved the issue of class litigation in
arbitration, but rather relegated that and similar questions to the
arbitrator's discretion in each case.
Matters of so-called procedural arbitrability 176 are best illustrated by
the issue of waiver. When a party to an arbitration agreement files and
pursues a judicial action or motion relating to an arbitrable dispute, its
77
conduct might result in the abandonment of its right to arbitrate.
Ordinarily, prior to the Court's ruling in Howsam,' 78 such an issue
implicated directly the enforceability of the contract of arbitration and,
therefore, came within the ambit of FAA § 3 and court authority. 179 The
current law places the resolution of such issues squarely within the
decisional power of the arbitrator. The Court again pushed the judiciary
out of the preliminary phase of the process and enhanced the arbitrators'
role in establishing the foundation for their decisional authority. 80 When
these rulings on arbitrator sovereignty are combined with Kaplan and the
Court's liberal rulings on subject-matter arbitrability, the result is the
complete exclusion of courts from the front-end of the arbitral process.181
The consequence is to enhance the autonomy and independent operation
of the arbitral process under U.S. law. The Court's objective in these
rulings seems to have been to eliminate or at least reduce significantly
the litigation about arbitration and to allow the recourse to arbitration to
have its projected impact upon court dockets. 182
V.

CONCLUSION

National courts can play a vital role in giving arbitration a function
in the operation of the legal system. Judicial decisions can transform
legislative enactments on arbitration into either meaningful or empty
regulatory provisions.
The New York Arbitration Convention is
83
recognized as the modem-day charter of international arbitration.'
Article V(2)(b) of the Convention recognizes that public policy can serve
84
as a defense to the enforcement of international arbitral awards.'
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See id
See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (para II) (2002).
See id.
Id.
9 U.S.C. § 3.
See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444,451-52 (2003).
See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND
PRACTICE 236-37 (4th ed. 2007) [hereinafter CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION LAW AND
PRACTICE].

182.
183.
184.

See id. at 238.
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
See supra note I at art. V(2)(b).
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National courts, however, establish what public policy actually means in
the circumstances of individual cases. It is at this point in the legal
process that true regulatory power resides. In fact, as noted earlier, 185 in
an attempt to foster the development of international commercial
arbitration, French courts developed and administered a concept of
"international" public policy, declaring that this less demanding standard
regulated the enforcement of transborder awards.
The U.S. Supreme Court went one better. When it was confronted
with the circumstances of international litigation, 186 the Court began to
develop, perhaps for the first time in the history of the U.S. legal
system,1 87 the basic tenets of a private international law to address the
legal questions generated by that form of litigation. 88 It concluded that
contract freedom was the most effective and efficient regulatory
The Court also
principle in transborder commercial matters.1 89
emphasized the need to enforce the parties' agreement to submit disputes
to arbitral adjudication.' 9" It reinforced and expanded the arbitrators'
authority to rule, as well as the finality of arbitral awards. 191
The shaping and systemic stature of arbitration depend upon the
judicial response to the process. As Jean Robert said years ago,192 judges
must be persuaded of the doctrinal merit and practical virtues of
arbitration and the ability of arbitrators to shoulder the burdens of
adjudication. The endorsement of arbitration also implies recognition of
the limitations of the methodology of judicial litigation,1 93 that the
pursuit of the national interest or justice can require a commitment to a
non-sectarian and enlightened policy, 194 and that alterations in human

civilization demand an adjustment by local legal systems.' 95 The
continuing English reticence toward arbitration is a relatively safe
position given its more circumscribed contemporary character, the
universality of the English language in world commerce, the importance
of the common law, and the quality of the arbitration bar in London. It
still, however, comes at a price. It is one thing to have courts correct
185. See Carbonneau, Elaboration,supra note 28, at 36-40; supra notes 102-04 and
accompanying text.
186. See M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 14 n. 16 (1972).
187. See CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 181, at 669-72.
188. See id
189. Id.
190. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 (1974), reh'g denied, 419
U.S. 885 (1974).
191. See generally Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614 (1985).
192. Interview of Maitre Jean Robert in Paris, France (Oct. 14, 1979).
193. See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, at xv-xxiv, 57-76.
194. See id.
195. See id.
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salient, exceptional abuses of the process; it is quite another matter to
distrust the decisional capabilities of the arbitrators by continuing to
incorporate safeguards against arbitral decisions in the statutory law.
The retention of a would-be judicial safety valve is not a practice
that will advance the interests of arbitration, society, or global
commerce.
Admitting to the failures of judicial litigation and
recognizing the need to transcend parochial views of legality constitute a
better practice and policy. 196 If arbitration is to remain successful, the
shadow of vestigial doubts must be extinguished through the light of
unconditional acceptance. Law is but a lifeless platitude when it cannot
be applied effectively to the resolution of disputes.
Arbitration serves a two-fold fundamental purpose: It allows States
to transcend parochial differences in legal process, regulatory policies,
and political ideology and enables their citizens to engage in the business
of international commerce. The latter not only spreads prosperity, but it
also fosters democratic values and freedom on a worldwide basis even in
the most resistant States. At a domestic level, arbitration has permitted
the United States to maintain and reinforce the democratic character of
American society by empowering a class of Americans, often neglected
and ignored by the legal system, to have a right of redress of their
grievances. Further, it allows merchants and companies to expend more
resources on their commercial activities by supplying them with a frugal,
fair, and final form of expert and effective adjudication. The Court's
activity on arbitration during the last forty years has created a new civil
procedure that warrants the attention, support, and endorsement of all
American citizens. The legal experimentation with arbitration needs to
continue to shape the character of American economic relations, society,
197
and democracy.

196. See M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 14 n.16 (1972).
197. But see Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782 and H.R. 3010, 110th Cong.
(2007). "The stated purpose of the bills is to dismantle the process of mandatory
arbitration in disparate-party transactional circumstances: '[N]o predispute arbitration
agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of: (1) an employment,
consumer, or franchise dispute, or (2) a dispute arising under any statute intended to
protect civil rights or to regulate contracts or transactions between parties of unequal
bargaining power.' Id.It also eliminates, apparently in all arbitration circumstances, the
jurisdictional or kompetenz-kompetenz powers of the arbitrator: '[T]he validity or
enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate shall be determined by a court, under federal
law, rather than an arbitrator, irrespective of whether the party resisting arbitration
challenges the arbitration agreement specifically or in conjunction with other terms of the
contract containing such agreement.' Id.The latter provision reverses or eliminates the
effect of the separability doctrine. It also seems to eliminate any reference to state
contract law and to create-wholesale-a special federal law of contracts applying
exclusively to arbitration agreements. This federal contract law for arbitration propounds
the limited validity of arbitration contracts and places particular encumbrances upon their
range of application. In effect, if the bill is enacted into law, the U.S. Congress will
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discriminate against arbitration as a form of contract by placing disabling requirements
upon it in certain transactions. By so doing, the Congress will be engaging in conduct
that the U.S. Supreme Court forbade to the states for years through the federal
preemption doctrine.
"Finally, in keeping with Justice William 0. Douglas' legacy on arbitration, the
proposed legislation 'exempts arbitration in collective bargaining agreements' from the
regulation established in the legislation. Justice Douglas was a virulent critic of
arbitration in all circumstances but those of labor-management relations. Like Justice
Douglas, the proponents of the legislation approve of the traditional role of arbitration in
achieving industrial self-governance in the unionized workplace. In their view, union
representation establishes a sufficient level of protection to guarantee the essential
fairness of this application of arbitration. It is again interesting to note that the federal
decisional law, especially the rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court, arrives at a
diametrically opposed conclusion. In the latter, the Court believed that the union's
collective interest prevented union members from asserting their personal acquiescence to
the arbitrability of their individual statutory rights through the union. As a result, the
individual union member needed to affirm personally the arbitrability of disputes
involving citizenship guarantees. In the final analysis, it is difficult to comprehend why
an employee's interests are seen as advantaged in one form of arbitration and not the
other.
"It should be emphasized that the stated purpose of the proposed legislation not only
bans arbitral clauses in the identified transactional circumstances, but it also prohibits the
arbitrability of civil rights disputes on a subject matter basis. Both aspects of the bills
stand in contradistinction to the U.S. Supreme Court's long-standing decisional law on
arbitration. The latter provides for a wide, if not unlimited, rule of arbitrability that is not
constrained by subject-matter considerations or transactional inequality. The Court's
objective in devising this law was to guarantee citizen access to a functional and effective
process of adjudication. The proposed law simply bans arbitration without creating more
courts, naming judges to unfilled positions, or correcting the abuses and dysfunctionality
of judicial litigation."
See Thomas E. Carbonneau, "Arbitracide": The Story ofAnti-Arbitration Sentiment
in the U.S. Congress, 18 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 233,246-49 (2007).

